Tony at Number 9..?

Three in midfield.
Three up front.

Square the magic numbers
and what you get is… false?


The 21st century has brought football an intriguing new formation to the English game, with Mourinho believing in it at then-Chelski, (the other) Fergie daring to experiment – and succeed – in beating Arsenal in a Champions’ League semi-final away 2nd-leg. This before a decade of attacking masterclasses from Barca and Real, to name just two footballing giants.


Rather convenient that I would then fail to make an honourable mention to the 3rd-best manager in the world!

The 4-3-3 may have defined player positions, but far from defined requirements to play any of the three positions on the forward line – at least, when your team happens to be in possession of the football.

The previous paragraph-alone may help explain why Everton took 20 years to even try to adopt this formation in its first team personnel, although there are many other explanations we won’t regurgitate for the nth time.

But this article focuses on the case FOR AND AGAINST utilising the 4-3-3 frontline with a personnel change term I for one had never heard used before in the 21-odd years I was alive in the 20th century: the ‘false nine’.


Everton has long loved a tall, muscular presence up-front, to battler away at, if not bully, centre-halves – relish it or not they may in opposition. And we’re far from alone on this, that is, if you don’t define all supporters of one given club as all the same; Arsenal fans will have loved the days of Alan Smith playing head tennis with Tony Adams, Steve Bould and Martin Keown, with Kevin Campbell an always willing to chip-in when required. Many could easily name effective players of generations prior to the late-1980s-to-early-1990s as well.

In the Premier League, the last successful generation of two #9 player combinations was Sutton & Shearer in 1993-96. This, when Manchester United and Newcastle, among many, were playing a 4-4-1-1 formation; the number #10 (in Eric Cantona and Peter Beardsley) charged with roaming from area-to-area and drawing centre-halves and anchoring midfielders out of position, as well as linking up play when the chance to move forward arose.

Others didn’t necessarily have a gifted #10 to select, but adopted the idea of using was one target man to feed off – whenever pitches were not ideal for passing with precision AND accuracy; our Fergie an obvious example.

Yet whilst most pundits in the press slowly accepted the ‘Christmas tree’ formation was the way to go in the mid-1990s, many still felt that the temptation to hoof long balls was holding back our game; an easy, luxurious ‘way out’ for less talented players.

That was to lead to a turning point in the Premier League a decade later:
either with a 4-1-4-1 formation, affording one midfielder at any time to support an often-overworked lone #9 striker, with two wide midfielders providing crosses with overlapping full-backs,
or a 4-2-3-1, where a #10 forward had the licence to roam, but two other attack-minded midfielders were expected to link-up play,
with two holding midfielders in both formations protecting defensive lines.

Given the increased mobility workload charged to the #9 strikers of the noughties, it was almost common for midfielders to be various clubs’ top goalscorer; Lampard and Cristiano Ronaldo both winning the Premier League golden boot at least once. Tim Cahill: an extremely effective goalscorer in a reluctantly conservative David Moyes team pieced together with little resources in perspective of a rapidly changing outlook on English AND European professional sport.


The previous eleven paragraphs of recent footballing historical waffle lead us to an issue Jose Mourinho would probably have been the first to notably be forced into dealing with, albeit Ronald Koeman considerably responsible for allowing such a situation to arise at Goodison in 2017: that is, the accommodation of MORE than one #10 in one team – in the Dutchman’s case, without a seasoned #9 to field as well.

During and beyond Jose Mourinho’s first spell at Stamford Bridge, keeping Juan Mata, Eden Hazard AND Oscar all the happiest of bunnies was never going to be easy, for the general consensus that you can only field ONE #10 player in the role of free-roaming in the central areas of the pitch in one team, at any one time, with limited defensive responsibilities – IF you also field a #9 striker. It wasn’t long before one of the three gifted players mentioned above was allowed to move to China and another to Old Trafford.

The #9 mentioned (in Didier Drogba), did stay ‘til Chelski’s first ‘top table’ trophy win in Munich, 2012. But thereafter, in-between Nicolas Anelka’s departure and Diego Costa’s arrival, Roberto Di Matteo, Rafael Benitez and Jose Mourinho all tried moving away from 4-2-3-1, in favour of a 4-3-3 with Hazard a ‘false #9’. A soon departed Ronaldo to central Spain as thee left of a Benzema-speared front three and not long later, a certain Luis Suarez leading a Nou Camp equivalent; black and white position roles were now being completely torn from the text book.


I could waffle on-and-on over Fantasy Football and successful/unsuccessful captaincies - or lack of!?!

In the mould of Eden Hazard; that ideology of a ‘target man’ no longer being a mandatory requirement – even in the super-physical English top flight – has finally been faced by our club.

In fact, faced by us for a second time in 18 months.


You may regrettably recall a 4-0 hiding we took on an early August pre-season friendly at Old Trafford. An absent Dominic Calvert-Lewin clearly missed on a rain-soaked Saturday lunchtime performance littered with Evertonian mistakes, Rafa Benitez experimenting with no #9, unlike Ancelotti’s 3-3 Old Trafford comeback the previous Winter.


So the cases FOR and AGAINST:

Starting with the scenario of waiving one of DCL and Neal Maupay, along with the rumoured imminent departure of a work-willing but technically-limited Abdoulaye Doucoure, either to upgrade in one key area of the squad or simply obey the accountancy restrictions we’ve come critically-close to an extremely potent punishment for.

Do we dare say goodbye to a very loyal and dedicated young striker in Calvert-Lewin, in terms of the injuries that have bitten hard since the lockdown stoppages? Indeed, whilst the Arsenal interest rumours have cooled upon the goal stats declining; Newcastle do still seem tempted to make another rumoured compelling offer for his services.

Letting go of Maupay would only point towards short-term decision-making – something a club strongly in suspicion of financial mishandling really could do without.

It’s a tough one to call in any one direction, despite some consistently-promising performances by our academy players; for as it’s been for a long time now – things could potentially go horribly wrong, very quickly, and it’s not as if we haven't been using up all our good luck for quite a while. The right decision has to be made, with just about zero room for error.


All this said, I’ve yet to mention the most crucial area of this article’s focus:
WHO ON EARTH COULD SUCCESSFULLY PLAY THE FALSE NINE POSITION?


With Demarai Gray the perfect, right-footed left-of-three
and an ever-improving young Dwight McNeil likewise a left-footed right-of-three;
are BOTH these two players wasted with – OR without – a FALSE NINE?

And WHO is the latter’s identity, should it be made a reality..?

My answer?
The one player, who, from the very moment I saw brought on by Carlo in a bullied-into-submission, Everton ten-man-team on the south coast in September 2020, possessed credentials I have rarely seen in any Evertonian since the days we were a leading footballing force in Europe.


We’ve all talked about Anthony Gordon’s strengths and weaknesses:
resistance to opposing superiority,
leadership durability,
care for his club,
high-quality finishing -
if a little unaware of dribbling the football out of play, with or without assistance from opposing players.


But have we in any way touched upon the possibility of Anthony Gordon actually leading Everton’s frontline like no other previous?

Would we have a problem in asking him to perform the muscular roles; faith in his fitness/health against strong defenders?

With McNeil the genetically-ideal right-of-three
and Gray clearly suited to the left,
I’ll leave you al with the questions:

1. Is GORDON too good an attacking #9 to ignore, given the recent goal drought?

2. Does our youth academy consist of sufficient talent to let a senior professional leave?
And if so – who(m)?

3. Would ANY ‘False Nine’ bring even more from Demarai Gray and Dwight McNeil, as to any other options we already either have, or are capable of finding?


Merry Christmas to you all. Enjoy 2023…